Roper v. Simmons

Roper v. Simmons
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 13, 2004 Decided March 1, 2005
Full case name	Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Petitioner v. Christopher Simmons
Docket no.	03-633
Citations	543 U.S. 551 (more) 125 S. Ct. 1183; 161 L. Ed. 2d 1; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2200; 73 U.S.L.W. 4153; 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 131
Argument	Oral argument
Case history
Prior	Defendant convicted, motion for postconviction relief denied, Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Missouri; affirmed, State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953 (1997). Denial of petition for a writ of habeas corpus affirmed, Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001). Petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted, State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
Holding
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, and Stanford v. Kentucky overruled.
Court membership
Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy David Souter · Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
Majority	Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
Concurrence	Stevens, joined by Ginsburg
Dissent	O'Connor
Dissent	Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Stanford v. Kentucky (1989)

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18. The 5–4 decision overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, in which the court had upheld execution of offenders at or above age 16, and overturned statutes in 25 states.

Background

In a line of cases reaching back to Weems v. United States (1910) the Supreme Court has elaborated that the Eighth Amendment protects the dignity of all persons, "even those convicted of heinous crimes". Excessive and disproportionate punishments are prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment by the Court's precedent. The Court has applied an "evolving standards of decency" test to decide which punishments are unconstitutionally excessive.

The Court has limited the death penalty to offenders who commit the "most serious crimes" and who are "the most deserving of execution" based on their culpability and blameworthiness. The Supreme Court has restricted death sentences by crime (see Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida) and class of offender (see Thompson v. Oklahoma, Ford v. Wainwright and Atkins v. Virginia).

When the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 1977 case Gregg v. Georgia that decision was justified by retributive and deterrent purposes of state death penalty statutes. When Atkins was decided in 2002 the Court, quoting from Coker v. Georgia, brought its own judgment "to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment" and decided that diminished personal capacity makes the death penalty an excessive punishment for the intellectually disabled because the public purposes of retribution and deterrence are not served by executing the mentally impaired.

In 1988 a plurality barred execution of offenders under the age of 16 in Thompson v. Oklahoma. The following year Stanford v. Kentucky, upheld the possibility of capital punishment for offenders who were 16 or 17 years old when they committed the capital offense. The court found there was no national consensus that the execution of older adolescents was cruel and unusual under "evolving standards of decency" because the sentence was still permitted by a majority of death penalty jurisdictions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concurring in the Stanford judgment, was critical of the plurality's refusal "to judge whether the nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness is proportional."

In the Roper decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said the Stanford plurality had failed “to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of...offenders". Finding that "penological justifications for the death penalty apply to [juveniles] with lesser force than to adults", The Court reversed Stanford.

Case history

In the state of Missouri in 1993, 17-year-old Christopher Simmons concocted a plan to commit burglary and murder, having previously told friends that he "wanted to kill someone" and that he "believed he could get away with it because he was a minor". Simmons convinced two of his friends to join him: 15-year-old Charles Benjamin and 16-year-old John Tessmer. Simmons met with Benjamin and Tessmer at 2 a.m. to carry out their plan, but Tessmer decided to leave before any crimes were committed. Simmons and Benjamin later broke into the home of Shirley Crook, a 46-year-old neighbor, where they duct-taped her mouth and eyes shut before abducting her in her van. Simmons drove Crook's van to Castlewood State Park and parked near a railroad trestle bridge, where Simmons and Benjamin unloaded Crook from the van. They then covered her head with a towel, wrapped her in electrical wire, and threw her off of the trestle bridge into the Meramec River while she was still alive and conscious. Crook's body was discovered that afternoon by a group of fishermen.

Simmons was heard "bragging about the murder" later that day and told his friends that he had killed a woman. The day after the murder, police arrested Simmons and Benjamin at their high school after receiving a tip that they were involved in the murder. At the police station in Fenton, Missouri, Simmons waived his right to attorney and agreed to answer questions. Simmons initially denied involvement but later confessed to the murder and agreed to perform a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene. Simmons further told detectives that he recognized Crook as someone he had been in a minor traffic accident with several months earlier and that he believed Crook recognized him as well.

Simmons was charged with first-degree murder, burglary, kidnapping, and stealing. He was tried as an adult. At trial, Tessmer testified that Simmons planned the murder in advance. The jury found Simmons guilty of Crook's murder and recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. For his role, Benjamin was sentenced to life without parole.

Lower court proceedings

Simmons moved for the trial court to set aside the conviction and sentence, citing, in part, ineffective assistance of counsel. His age, and thus impulsiveness, along with a troubled background, were brought up as issues that Simmons claimed should have been raised at the sentencing phase. The trial court rejected the motion, and Simmons appealed.

The case worked its way up the court system, with the courts continuing to uphold the death sentence. However, in light of a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in Atkins v. Virginia, that overturned the death penalty for the intellectually disabled, Simmons filed a new petition for state post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that "a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders" and held that such punishment now violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. They sentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole.

The State of Missouri appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court reversed Stanford and held that the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for juvenile offenders younger than 18.

Opinion of the Court

Under the "evolving standards of decency" test, the Court held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a person who was under the age of 18 when the crime was committed.

The Court found a "national consensus" based on state laws and jury sentencing behavior. At the time of the decision, 20 states had the juvenile death penalty on the books, but only six states had executed prisoners since 1989 for crimes committed as juveniles. Only three states had done so since 1994: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Furthermore, five of the states that allowed the juvenile death penalty when Sanford was decided in 1989 had since abolished it.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy says:

As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal".

The Court's "independent judgement" concluding that the death penalty was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for juveniles as a class relied on psychological and sociological studies to establish the diminished culpability of juveniles. Justice Kennedy makes three points explaining why juveniles are less culpable than adults:

1. Juveniles' "lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility" effects their decision making. Kennedy quotes from a study about adolescent behavior stating "adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior".
2. Juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. Kennedy says the circumstances of youth contribute to a juvenile's vulnerability. He cites Steinberg & Scott for the point that "legal minors lack the freedom that adults have to extricate them from a criminogenic setting".
3. Juveniles have more capacity to reform because their identities are less fixed than adults.

The Court concludes that the death penalty is excessive when imposed on juveniles because retribution against a class of offenders with dimished culpability is an inappropriate legislative purpose:

Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.

The Court notes the "absence of evidence of deterrent effect". The majority reasons that adolescents are not likely to be deterred, quoting from the Thompson plurality opinion to explain that imposing the death penalty would not serve a deterrent purpose for a class of prisoners who were unlikely to engage in "the kind of cost benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution".

The majority rejects the view taken by the dissent that youth was a mitigating factor to be taken into consideration during sentencing:

If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.

Finally, Justice Kennedy supports the Court's decision by looking to trends in other countries. He says the United States "stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty", but admits this fact is "not controlling":

The opinion of the world community, while not controlling outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.

The Court takes note of the fact that only Somalia and the United States had not ratified Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Justice Kennedy says the United Kingdom's abolition of the juvenile death penalty (and subsequent abolition of the death penalty in general) "bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries".

Dissents

The dissents questioned the majority's finding that a "national consensus" had formed, its methodology and the propriety of basing constitutional interpretation on foreign laws.

Scalia dissent

Justice Scalia wrote a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.

Justice Scalia's primary objection was that "the real driving force" of the majority's analysis was "the Court's own judgment" about deterrence and retribution. Scalia said sentencing decisions made by juries were based on the circumstances of each case. He critcized the majority's finding of a "national consensus" when more than half the states that allowed capital punishments also allowed the sentence to be imposed on juveniles.

In addition, Justice Scalia also objected in general to the Court's willingness to take guidance from foreign law in interpreting the Constitution:

Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center stage

He accused the majority of invoking foreign law selectively. He said the majority had taken it upon themselves to "ratify treaties on behalf of the United States" that were expressly rejected by the political branches.

Scalia also attacked the majority opinion as being fundamentally antidemocratic. His dissent cited a passage from The Federalist Papers in arguing that the role of the judiciary in the constitutional scheme is to interpret the law as formulated in democratically selected legislatures. He argued that it is for the legislature, acting in the manner prescribed in Article V of the Constitution to offer amendments to the Constitution in light of the evolving standard of decency, not for the Court to make what he considered de facto amendments.

O'Connor dissent

Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court's general methodology but disputed the majority's conclusions. She said the objective evidence for a national consensus was "weaker than in most prior cases in which the Court has struck down a particular punishment". Furthermore, she was skeptical of the Court's conclusion about diminished culpability for those who committed crimes before they turned 18 because the "mitigating characteristics associated with youth [did] not justify an absolute age limit".

Debate

Scientific evidence

Empirical developmental studies about adolescent behavior featured prominently during oral arguments and in the Court's reasoning. The majority's conclusion about the diminished culpability of 16 and 17 year olds was mostly based on psychological and sociological studies cited by the American Psychological Association in an amicus brief. Some of the amici briefs included neuroscience evidence and neuroimaging research but these were not directly cited by the Court. Rebecca Dresser says "it is not clear that the neuroscience evidence carries any special weight in the majority's reasoning". She says Roper showed that scientific evidence "can influence the attribution of responsibility for criminal acts" when the evidence is consistent with common sense observations. Laurence Steinberg, the chief scientific consultant for the APA's amicus brief says neuroscience evidence is "helpful and appropriate in providing concurrent validation of the behavioral science" asserting that "there are structural and functional changes in the brain during this time period [that] map onto what we know about behavioral changes".

The practice of amici submitting scientific evidence has been debated for many years. Justices have themselves acknowledged their limited qualifications to evaluate scientific evidence.

Foreign law

Roper reignited an ongoing academic debate about how American courts should decide whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. Because the Roper majority's finding of a national consensus was weak (twenty states still allowed executions for crimes committed by older adolescents), the Court was persuaded that foreign jurisdictions could provide "respected and significant confirmation" for their proportionality analysis.

Justices have mixed views about the relevance of international norms to "evolving standards of decency" analysis. Writing for the majority in Stanford Justice Scalia did not take the sentencing practices of foreign countries into consideration: "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive." Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg considered them relevant.

Impact

Pre-Roper minimum ages for executions by state

  No capital punishment

  Minimum age of 18

  Minimum age of 17

  Minimum age of 16

The Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons overturned the death sentences of 72 others who had already been convicted for crimes they committed while younger than age 18. The greatest effects were in Texas, where 29 juvenile offenders were awaiting execution, and in Alabama, where 13 on death row had been sentenced as juveniles.

The decision overturned the laws of 19 states that permitted 16 and 17 year olds to be executed.

The impact of this ruling was immediately felt in the State of Virginia, where Lee Boyd Malvo became no longer eligible for the death penalty for his role in the Beltway sniper attacks in October 2002. At the time of the attacks, Malvo was 17 years old. In light of this Supreme Court decision, the prosecutors in Prince William County decided not to pursue the charges against Malvo. At the outset of the Beltway sniper prosecutions, the primary reason for extraditing the two suspects from Maryland, where they were arrested, to Virginia, was the difference in how the two states deal with the death penalty. While the death penalty was allowed in Maryland, it was only applied to persons who were adults at the time of their crimes, whereas Virginia had also allowed the death penalty for offenders who had been juveniles when their crimes were committed.

Subsequent developments

After the Roper decision the APA filed briefs in Graham v Florida and Miller v. Alabama arguing that life without parole sentences for minors were unconstitutional based on developmental science about adolescent risk-taking behavior.

The State of Alabama sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, raising a single issue, "Whether this Court should reconsider its decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)". The Supreme Court denied certiorari (i.e., declined to take the case for review) on June 19, 2006, without a published dissent.

See also

• Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)
• Graham v. Florida (2010)
• Miller v. Alabama (2012)
• Capital punishment for juveniles in the United States

Further reading

• Lane, Charles (March 2, 2005) 5-4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions The Washington Post, p. A01.
• Boorstein, Michelle (October 27, 2004) Malvo Gets Two More Life Terms, Teen Sniper Enters Plea In Spotsylvania Attacks The Washington Post, p. B01.
• Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life without Parole on Juveniles, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 681 (1998).
• Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life without Parole after Roper, 47 B.C.L. Rev. 1083 (2006).
• Death Penalty Information Center – Juvenile Offenders Who Were On Death Row

External links

• Text of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) is available from: Cornell CourtListener Google Scholar Justia Oyez (oral argument audio) Supreme Court (slip opinion) (archived)
• Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper v. Simmons, October 13, 2004
• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, October 24, 2003
• Brief of Petitioner, Donald P. Roper, April 20, 2004
• Reply Brief of Petitioner, Donald P. Roper, September 7, 2004
• Brief of Respondent, Christopher Simmons, July 19, 2004